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Abstract 
 
The Indonesian social security program is currently undergoing a fundamental overhaul 
designed to make the existing system work better for the beneficiaries and to extend social 
security coverage to more workers, both in the formal and informal sector. The existing scheme 
has not been successful in its aims to provide adequate social security benefits to beneficiaries 
because of its low coverage, limited benefits, and low investment returns, combined with poor 
governance. The government has proposed a plan to convert the current social security scheme, 
which is based on a provident fund system, into a compulsory social insurance system. The 
plan is analyzed in this paper in order to examine the possible impact of the proposed scheme on 
the Indonesian labor market, investment flows, the government budget, and the economy in 
general.  
 
From this analysis, we can conclude that there are several serious flaws in the government 
proposal as outlined in the proposed legislation, such as: the proposed scheme could worsen 
Indonesia’s labor market and investment climate, worsen the government’s budget deficits, and 
does not provide room for the private sector to provide social security benefits to Indonesians. 
Many have concluded that publicly-provided social security schemes are no longer a viable 
model for workers today. Instead private social security schemes would suit the health and 
retirement needs of today’s workers better than public social security schemes. Given the many 
problems facing the Indonesian public pension and healthcare system today, Indonesia should 
seriously consider adopting private social security programs to replace the current publicly-
provided scheme.   
 
Keywords: social security, public pension, national health insurance, Indonesia. 
                                                 
1 The Indonesian Social Security System Bill discussed in this paper was passed by the Indonesian House 
of Representatives (DPR RI) on September 28, 2004.  This paper was written when the bill was still 
being discussed by DPR RI. 
 
2
 The author would like to thank Dr. Sudarno Sumarto, Dr. Asep Suryahadi, and Bambang Sulaksono for 
their suggestions and comments, and Daniel Perwira for his research assistance. The views expressed are 
solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the SMERU Research Institute, its 
management, or its donor agencies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Indonesian government has completed a draft law on the reform of the National 
Social Security System (also known as Jamsosnas) and it is expected to be approved by 
the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) later this year. It will replace the existing social 
security schemes (Askes, Jamsostek, Taspen, and Asabri) that have not been successful 
in providing adequate benefits to their beneficiaries due to their low level of 
enrollment, inadequate benefits for participants, and poor governance.  
 
The scheme proposed by the government is very comprehensive, consisting of an old-
age pension, National Health Insurance (NHI), death benefits, and worker disability 
schemes. It will cover all Indonesian citizens, regardless of whether they are formal 
workers, informal workers, or self-employed. 
 
The old-age pension program is a defined benefit social insurance program which will 
operate under a pay-as-you-go system. The defined benefit of this program is a 
percentage of an individual’s average income from the previous year, between a 
minimum of 60% and maximum of 80% of the local minimum wage (UMR). Each 
worker will receive a guaranteed minimum pension of at least 70% of the UMR.  
 
The NHI program is designed to provide comprehensive health benefits ranging from 
benefits for preventative treatments, such as immunization and family planning, to 
those which cover catastrophic illnesses, such as heart and kidney diseases. Both public 
and private health providers would be able to deliver these services, as long as they sign 
a service contract with the government.  
 
The cost of funding the National Social Security Program would be quite substantial for 
formal employers and workers who are obliged to make contributions to the scheme in 
order to receive its benefits. For the NHI program, formal sector workers must pay a 6% 
payroll tax on their gross income, which would be split equally with employers. Exact 
contributions from self-employed and informal sector workers will be decided at a later 
date, as is the case for the contribution rate for the public pension program.  
 
However, it is estimated that the total amount of combined payroll taxes that will have to 
be paid by formal sector employers and workers will be between 18% to 20% of worker’s 
payroll. Thus, the Jamsosnas scheme could create a substantial burden for formal employers 
and workers, as they will be the ones responsible for paying for these schemes.  
 
The Jamsosnas bill could make Indonesian businesses even less competitive, since it 
creates substantial new labor costs for companies. Employers could respond to this law 
by reducing their workers’ salaries to cover the required payroll taxes, thus reducing 
take-home-pay for workers. They could also reduce the number of workers they employ 
in order to reduce their business expenses. This could reduce the income of low-middle 
income workers, who are more likely to fall into poverty as a result of being laid off.  
 
Additionally, there are no known actuarial calculations that serve as a sound basis for 
determining the contribution levels and the payouts of this scheme, nor have there 
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been any reliable econometric analyses on the short and long-term impacts of this 
scheme on the labor market, the competitiveness of Indonesian businesses, and the 
Indonesian economy in general. Without such analyses, the impact of this scheme on 
the economy remains questionable and the adequacy of the proposed contribution rates 
in paying actual program benefits remains doubtful. 
 
The government’s plan to subsidize the coverage of low-income persons is also 
questionable. According to the draft law, Indonesians whose income falls below the 
UMR will be considered as low-income earners and will therefore be eligible to receive 
the government subsidy. However, there is a substantial number of Indonesians whose 
incomes are below the UMR rate, especially those who live in rural areas. If there were 
too many Indonesians eligible to receive this subsidy, the central government budget 
could run into a deficit, thus casting doubts on the long-term sustainability of the 
national social security program. 
 
The scheme also fails to address the problem of the rapidly aging population estimated 
to begin in the next few decades. Demographic estimates have shown that the 
Indonesian population aged 55 years and older will rise dramatically in the next few 
decades, from about 10% of the total population in 2000 to about 30% of the total 
population in 2050.  
 
The combination of a relatively low minimum retirement age (55 years), low minimum 
working years to qualify for pension (15 years) and a rapidly aging population is a recipe 
for disaster for any public pension program, and it seems that this proposed scheme will 
suffer from such a fate.  
 
Additionally, most of the costs incurred by the NHI scheme would be generated by the 
elderly. If there are insufficient funds available in the National Health Trust Fund to 
pay for their care, the NHI scheme could run into serious financial problems.  
 
Also, there is no requirement for service providers to provide health services to all NHI 
participants who wish to seek treatment in their facilities. Thus, some providers might 
choose not to sign contracts with the government and therefore not accept patients 
covered solely by the NHI scheme. If the above assumption were proven correct, both 
the choice and the quality of treatment available to patients would be severely limited. 
 
Finally, the scheme disregards the role of competition in providing social security benefits 
for Indonesians, since according to the bill, social security provision would become the sole 
responsibility of the government, in spite of the fact that most formal sector workers already 
have adequate health and retirement benefits from their employers. As a result of this 
monopoly, workers might lose their privately provided health and retirement coverage that 
might offer better benefits than the Jamsosnas scheme.  
 
Experiences from other countries in the world (especially Europe and Latin America) 
that have comprehensive social security schemes for their citizens show that publicly-
funded social security schemes have often failed due to problems relating to 
demographic transition, benefit levels that were too generous, not being financially 
sustainable, and often, poor governance. Many of these countries (such as Chile, 
Mexico, Poland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia) have pursued other 
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alternatives in providing social security for their citizens, specifically, by reforming their 
public social security programs.  
 
Based on these experiences, the provision and financing of social security programs 
should no longer be the sole responsibility of the government. In the above countries, it 
has been proven that the private sector can play a positive role in providing 
comprehensive social security coverage for citizens. This can be achieved through 
improving the quality of social security services available to the public, introducing 
competition in the provision of social security programs, and eventually, improving age 
and health indicators in these countries.  
 
Based on these facts, policymakers should revise the Jamsosnas bill significantly so that 
it does not create an additional burden for workers and businesses, is financially 
sustainable, provides adequate benefits to its participants, and promotes the 
involvement of the private sector in providing the social security coverage to the 
general public, through individual retirement and medical savings accounts schemes. 
This should be conducted under the three-pillar paradigm, which has been adopted in 
various countries, both developed and developing.  
 
The role of the government would be limited to issuing and enforcing appropriate 
regulations to safeguard the workers’ social security savings and to provide publicly-
funded social assistance (funded through general tax revenue) to the poorest 
Indonesians who are no longer able to work (e.g., the elderly and the permanently 
disabled).  
The SMERU Research Institute, September 2004 v 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Indonesia is in the middle of reforming its existing social security system, in order to 
make the existing system work better for beneficiaries, increase its benefits, and 
extend its coverage to more workers, both in the formal and informal sectors. It is 
recognized that a social security scheme that works well could improve the welfare of 
the people, especially that of the poor.  
 
Reforming the system is essential in improving the welfare of all Indonesians. With 
this in mind, Indonesia should choose a reform scheme that maximizes the welfare of 
all Indonesians, does not create an additional burden for workers and businesses, is 
financially sustainable, and gives greater autonomy to workers to have a voice in 
managing their own social security funds. 
 
First, this paper will describe the current national social security system (Jamsostek) 
and its weaknesses that have caused the scheme to be less than effective in providing 
social security for Indonesians. Then, the draft of the government’s pension reform 
plan, detailed in the Indonesian Social Security Law and currently being discussed in 
the Indonesian Parliament (DPR), will be analyzed. Finally, the paper will conclude 
with several policy recommendations and alternatives to this proposed reform 
scheme.  
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II. THE CURRENT INDONESIAN SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM 
2.1 Current Public Pension Programs in Indonesia  
 
Currently, only about 10% of all Indonesians (both workers and their families) have 
some form of pension coverage, either from publicly-funded pension schemes or 
private ones (mostly sponsored by large state-owned enterprises and multinational 
corporations) (ILO). There are several public pension programs that are sponsored 
and administered by the government at this time. The two largest programs are the 
Jamsostek program for private sector workers in the formal sector and the Taspen 
program for current and retired civil servants and their families.3  
 
2.1.1. The Jamsostek Provident Fund Scheme 
 
According to the Indonesian Social Security Law (Law No 3/1992), there are four 
different social security schemes in Indonesia including: (1) worker injury benefits; (2) 
death benefits; (3) retirement benefits; and (4) healthcare benefits. The law stipulates 
that the premiums for worker injury, death, and healthcare benefits are paid entirely by 
employers, while the retirement benefit premiums are shared by both employers and 
workers. Worker injury, death, and retirement benefits are invested in a provident fund 
managed entirely by a state-owned company, PT Jamsostek, while the healthcare 
program can be contracted out to a private provider if it can be shown that the benefits 
would be either similar or surpass the benefits provided by PT Jamsostek (ILO, 93). 
 
Table 1.  Contributions/Premiums for the Jamsostek Program (% of wages) 
Program Employers Workers Total 
Workplace Accident 
Benefits Program (JKK) 
0.24 – 1.74 
(5 classes) - 0.24 – 1.74 
Death Benefits Program 
(JK) 
 
0.3 - 0.3 
Retirement Benefits 
Program (JHT) 
 
3.7 2 5.7 
Healthcare Benefits 
Program (JPK) 3 – 6 - 3 – 6 
Total 7.24 – 11.74 2 9.24 – 13.74 
Source: PT Jamsostek (2001). 
 
                                                 
3 In addition to these two schemes, there is also the Asabri pension scheme for members of the armed 
forces and their families. However, since little public information is available about this scheme, it is 
not reviewed in this paper. 
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Table 1 shows the specific social security premiums that have to be paid by both 
employers and workers. Each employer has to make a contribution of between 7.24 
and 11.24% of the total wages paid to their workers. This amount is equal to about 
one month of a worker’s annual salary.4 In addition, each worker has to contribute 
2% of their wages to the retirement benefits program. The Jamsostek program is 
currently undergoing fundamental reform, which is being undertaken to fix structural 
problems. The existing social security system has failed to prevent those affected by 
the Indonesian economic crisis from falling below the poverty line.  
 
This is because in many ways the current system is inadequate. First, it does not cover 
informal sector workers, individuals who are self-employed, and formal sector workers 
who are employed by small businesses (with 10 employees or less). This means that 
the vast majority of Indonesian workers (80% of the total workforce) are not covered 
by this scheme. In addition, it is also estimated that only about half of the employers 
required by the Indonesian Social Security Law to make contributions to the scheme 
are actually making contributions (ILO, 63). Thus, the number of workers that are 
actually covered by the Jamsostek program is abysmally low. 
 
Additionally, Jamsostek does not create adequate incentives for its members to save for 
retirement because the benefits received by those who make contributions to Jamsostek 
are very small. A World Bank study done by Leechor estimates that the total pension 
payments received by a Jamsostek recipient at retirement is only valued at about 7% of 
their final basic salary after 35 years of active work (36), while another study conducted 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO) found that the average value of a 
Jamsostek pension only amounts to five and a half months of their basic salary or eight 
and a half months of the current minimum wage (UMR) (ILO, 90). It has been 
concluded that these workers would earn a better rate of return on their investments if 
they put their retirement savings into a bank account rather than the Jamsostek scheme.  
 
In addition, the rate of return on investments in the Jamsostek fund is also very low. 
The ILO found that income from such investments is valued cumulatively at 38% 
below the level of inflation and 63% less than the average market rate (ILO, 94). 
This is caused by the fact that the Jamsostek fund is invested mostly in banks – 80% 
in 1997 and 86% in June 1999 (Perwira et.al.). While such an investment is 
considered relatively safe, in the long run, it earns less than other investment 
schemes, such as those invested in stocks, bonds, and mutual funds.  
 
Finally, critics have argued that the management of the Jamsostek fund has not been 
open and transparent. For instance, it has been found that PT Jamsostek as the sole 
provider of publicly-funded retirement benefits in Indonesia has failed to provide 
financial statements and regular progress reports that can be accessed by workers 
participating in the scheme and the general public (Leechor, 39). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Including the requirement for employers to pay a bonus equivalent of one month’s wages for the Idul 
Fitri holiday, employers are required to pay around two months’ wages per year in addition to normal 
salaries.   
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When we look at the level of benefits received by workers covered by Jamsostek, 
combined with the low return on investment and lack of transparency, it is no 
wonder that most Indonesian employers and employees have little faith in the 
scheme providing social protection for them. The fact that only about half of all 
employers who are required to participate in the Jamsostek scheme are making 
contributions to the scheme is testament to the low confidence of employers and 
employees in the scheme as they instead choose to provide these benefits through the 
private sector. 
 
2.1.2. The Taspen Program for Civil Servants 
 
The Taspen (Social Insurance and Retirement Savings for Civil Servants) scheme 
was created in 1963 to provide retirement benefits, death benefits, and retirement 
savings by providing both a lump sum and monthly pensions for participants or their 
inheritors. It is hoped that this benefit can provide financial support for members 
after retirement. This scheme was expanded to include special pension schemes for 
elderly members, their inheritors, and members who are disabled based upon 
Government Regulation No. 25/1981 on “Social Insurance for Civil Servants.” 
 
All members of the Taspen scheme are Indonesian civil servants, which is defined as 
those who are employed as civil servants by either a government official or a 
government agency, and are paid regular salaries according to the prevailing civil 
servant salary schedule based upon the central and local government’s budget. 
Members of the armed forces and the police force are covered under a separate 
pension scheme called Asabri (Social Insurance for Members of the Armed Forces), 
which was created on August 1, 1971. Since then, they have not been eligible to 
receive Taspen benefits.  
 
The civil servants retirement benefits scheme managed by PT Taspen consists of an 
old-age savings scheme and a pension scheme. Government Regulation No. 25/1981 
describes these schemes in the following ways:  
 
The old-age savings scheme is an insurance program, consisting of a compulsory 
savings scheme and death benefits for members and their immediate families.  
The pension scheme provides an income to members on a monthly basis, which is 
set according to the prevailing laws and regulations. It is given to civil servants 
and/or their immediate families who met the following criteria:  
- Has reached retirement age (currently 56 years). 
- If they died while serving as civil servants, the pension will be given to 
their spouses or children. 
- If they died after retiring from the civil service, the pension will be given 
to their spouses or their children who have not reached 25 years of age.  
 
Monthly pension benefits for members amount to 2.5% of their basic salary 
multiplied by the number of years they served in the civil service. This scheme is 
mainly funded by the national budget (APBN) but is also funded by contributions 
from members, which amount to 4.75% of their base salaries.  
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At present, there are approximately four million civil servants and they contribute up 
about 8% of the funds for PT Taspen’s programs.5 PT Taspen contributes about 
22.5% of the overall expenses, derived from its enormous assets and investment 
income from member contributions. The rest of the expenses (69.5%) are paid for by 
the government budget (ILO). However, given the recent increase in civil servant 
salaries and pension benefits, it is estimated that the Taspen scheme will not be 
sustainable in the long run. Leechor has predicted that the funds available to pay the 
full pension benefits of all civil servants will run into a deficit starting in 2006 and 
without changes in contribution rates, it might become insolvent by 2015 (29). 
 
PT Taspen’s financial state has been made worse by the existing laws that restrict the 
government from providing advanced funding for the Taspen scheme. It is estimated 
that to fully fund the Taspen pension scheme, an additional 3.25% of civil servants’ 
basic salaries is required. Furthermore, the total contribution from the government 
for the Taspen pension scheme would be about 66% of the central government’s 
routine budget by 2020. This would certainly have a serious impact on the 
government’s fiscal position (Leechor, 29-30).  
 
Compared to the Jamsostek scheme, Taspen’s pension fund provides more benefits for its 
member, because the value of pensions for members is estimated at 100% of their final 
salaries after 35 years in the civil service, a rate that is much better than Jamsostek 
pensions, which only amount to around 11% of members’ final salaries after 35 years of 
work (Leechor, 24). This generous pension benefit was decided upon because the official 
salaries of Indonesian civil servants are very low. However, the difference in pension 
benefits has resulted in the perception that the government takes care of its employees 
when they retired, whereas it does not pay enough attention to the general public.  
 
2.2. Current Public Health Insurance Schemes in Indonesia 
 
According to the 2003 ILO study, only 15% of Indonesians are currently covered by 
some form of health insurance scheme provided either by the public or private sector. 
There are three major categories of government-sponsored health insurance: 
insurance for civil servants and army personnel (Askes), insurance for formal private 
sector workers (Jamsostek), and community health funds and the Community Health 
Maintenance Organizations (JPKM). 
 
2.2.1. The Askes Insurance Scheme 
 
About half of the insured Indonesians (around 7% of the population) receive their 
health insurance through PT Askes, a state-owned enterprise that administers health 
insurance for civil servants, retired civil servants, army personnel and their 
dependents.  
 
                                                 
5 More specifically, this contribution consists of 4.75% of a civil servant’s monthly salary for the 
Taspen’s defined benefit monthly pension scheme and 3.25% of a civil servant’s monthly salary for the 
Taspen’s defined contribution compulsory retirement savings scheme. 
The SMERU Research Institute, September 2004 6 
The Askes program is funded through a 2% payroll deduction from civil servants’ 
salaries.  Payments are based on the capitation system,6 budgeting system and benefits 
package that are consistent with community health maintenance principles. Health 
services are provided through a health maintenance organization (HMO) network7 
that is structured to provide promotive, preventive, curative, and rehabilitative 
treatments.  
 
However, PT Askes feels that the 2% premium is too low and affects the quality of 
health services for the program’s beneficiaries. Hospitals and clinics that become service 
providers for PT Askes pay for a large portion of the health services provided because the 
Askes program only reimburses a small amount for the services provided for Askes 
beneficiaries. Even government subsidies to help these hospitals and clinics treat Askes 
beneficiaries do not cover all expenses. As a result, the number of services provided for 
Askes beneficiaries are often quite limited. For instance, most low-ranking civil servants 
receive the lowest level of inpatient care available (1D class) and it is very difficult for 
them to obtain access to a good referral system. (Perwira et. al.) 
 
2.2.2. The Jamsostek Health Insurance Scheme 
 
Another 1.3% of Indonesians receive their health insurance from a plan sponsored by 
PT Jamsostek (another state-owned company) which provides insurance for formal 
private sector workers. The premium for this scheme is 3% for single employees and 
6% for employees who are married. Employers are fully responsible for paying this 
premium. The benefits are provided to employees, their spouse, and their children 
under the age of 21 years (up to the third child). In 2000, only about 2.7 million 
Indonesians were covered by the PT Jamsostek health scheme. This number is quite 
small given the program’s potential, because it is estimated that there are about 100 
million people (workers and their families) who could be covered under the 
Jamsostek law (Law No 3/1992) (ILO, 207). 
 
One cause of the low number of workers registering with PT Jamsostek’s health plan is 
the existence of an opt-out clause that allows companies to join private health insurance 
schemes provided that the private scheme provides greater benefits than PT Jamsostek’s 
plan. As a result, larger employers tend to opt out of the Jamsostek health scheme 
altogether and seek private health insurance for their employees. Only small employers 
with an average of 79 employees participate in the Jamsostek health insurance program. 
Another cause of the low number is the high level of noncompliance and evasion by 
companies participating in the Jamsostek program (ILO, 207). 
 
 
                                                 
6 A capitation-based reimbursement system is a health service reimbursement system under which 
healthcare providers receive regular fixed payments for each patient in their care, regardless of the 
services actually provided to the patient (Rosen, 209). 
7 A Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is a healthcare provider that offers comprehensive 
healthcare from an established panel of providers (doctors, midwives, etc) that have signed a contract 
with this organization and who are paid using a capitation-based reimbursement scheme (Rosen, 533). 
Common features of HMOs include voluntary membership, comprehensive health services, 
community rating premiums, and closed system delivery (ILO, 203). 
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PT Jamsostek subcontracts the provision of healthcare to other parties called “main 
providers.” Many of these parties are JPKM providers (or badan pelaksana as they are 
called in Indonesia) which are insurance carriers, not healthcare providers. Payments 
to providers (hospitals, doctors and midwives) are not made directly by Jamsostek, 
but instead are made on a capitation basis to the main providers. This system could 
lead to inefficiencies and higher costs, as main providers will take a portion of these 
payments as profits rather than channeling 100% toward actual health services. In 
addition, since many main providers do not actually own their own health services, 
they often subcontract health services to third-party providers, leading to higher 
administrative expenses. It is estimated that about 40% of Jamsostek health insurance 
contributions are used to cover various administrative costs, which means that a less 
than substantial amount actually goes to health provisions. Finally, PT Jamsostek has 
no standard procedure for the selection of main providers. This could lead to abuse by 
Jamsostek officials in the form of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in the selection 
of main providers (ILO, 208-209). 
 
Because most health providers in Indonesia are still operating on a fee-for-service 
basis and capitation-based payments are not common, most providers (both hospitals 
and doctors) do not want to sign a contract with PT Jamsostek and therefore do not 
accept Jamsostek health insurance patients. As a result, the actual benefits of this 
insurance scheme are limited since the choice of providers available to members is 
limited. In addition, there are a limited number of services covered by the Jamsostek 
health insurance program. Inpatient services are limited to a maximum of 60 days, 
with a limit of 20 days for intensive care services. The plan does not cover treatment 
for various catastrophic illnesses, such as kidney dialysis, cancer treatment, cardiac 
surgery, and organ transplants; treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, 
alcoholism, and drug abuse; or any service provided by non-contracted providers 
(ILO, 209, 211). 
 
In conclusion, the Jamsostek health insurance program has not been successful in 
attaining its goal to cover all private sector workers in Indonesia. Given the limited 
number of providers willing to accept the scheme, the lack of health benefits offered, 
and high administrative costs, it is no wonder that most employers and workers chose 
to opt out of the Jamsostek scheme and instead choose other private health insurance 
plans that provide greater benefits.  
 
2.2.3. The Community Health Fund and Community Health Maintenance (JPKM) Scheme  
 
The community health schemes in Indonesia began in the 1970s when the 
government introduced the village health fund (dana sehat). This fund was set up to 
substitute the decline in the central government’s health sector allocation after the 
fall in oil revenues in the mid 1970s. Their goal is to make local communities self-
sufficient and self-reliant in financing their basic health provisions (ILO, 194). 
 
In practice, however, few people contribute to community health schemes. It is 
estimated that in 1998, only 1.87% of the population were members of community 
health funds. Even when contributions to community health funds are supposed to be 
compulsory, many people simply choose not to contribute to the fund and, moreover, 
enforcement is lax. Factors that are attributed to low enrollment are the low cost of 
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treatment in public health centers (so there is no incentive to join a community 
health scheme) and the high level of financial assistance given to poor communities 
to meet healthcare expenses, especially after the 1997/98 economic crisis. 
Contributions from health fund members are very low, which has resulted in the fund 
being insufficient to cover even basic health treatments.  
 
Community health schemes also suffer from a high dropout rate (it is estimated that 
around 90% of participants dropout in the first or second year). Contributions are not 
collected based on sound actuarial principles and funds are often managed by local 
government officials with little knowledge of healthcare financing. As a result, community 
health funds are vulnerable to corruption, collusion and nepotism (ILO,195). 
 
Beside community health funds, the government also encouraged the development of 
JPKMs, which were modeled on HMOs in the United States. JPKMs were developed 
based on Law No. 23/1992 and were regulated by the Ministry of Health. They were 
promoted extensively after the 1997/98 economic crisis. Financial incentives were 
given to insurance companies, cooperatives, and foundations to establish HMOs in 
each district. Within months, 354 HMOs had been created, mostly by civil servants, 
civil servant retirees, or cooperatives. They often did not have experience in 
managing such schemes, which could have lead to mismanagement. After much 
criticism and seeing that it was obvious that many of the HMOs would ultimately 
fail, the government stopped the program after only one year. There were never more 
than 100,000 members in the JPKM plans (ILO, 195, 203).8 
 
We can conclude that the government’s efforts to create a community health scheme 
for the poor so far have been unsuccessful due to the lack of benefits, low cost of 
treatment at health centers, an unwillingness to contribute to the schemes, and poor 
management of the various health schemes. 
                                                 
8 There are indications that the Indonesian Ministry of Health is planning to resurrect the JPKM 
scheme under the National Healthcare System Bill currently being drafted. At present, copies of this 
draft law are not publicly available. 
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III. THE PROPOSED INDONESIAN NATIONAL 
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM BILL (RUU JAMSOSNAS) 
 
 
3.1. An Overview of the Draft Bill 
 
According to the Government of Indonesia’s Academic Paper on the National Social 
Security System (GOI, “Academic Paper”) the new Indonesian national social 
security system will be established in accordance with the three-pillar approach 
recommended by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The first pillar is 
social assistance for citizens who lack the financial means or access to services to 
meet their basic needs. This assistance is given to people who are genuinely in need, 
in the event of natural disasters, social unrest, illness, old age, or loss of employment. 
It will be financed by the state budget and/or by community (public) funds. The 
second pillar is a compulsory social insurance scheme, financed by contributions paid 
by both employers and employees. A person’s contribution is related to their income 
or wage and is based upon society’s current minimum standards of living. The third 
pillar is voluntary private insurance, in which a person may opt to take out additional 
insurance. The contribution paid by participants varies according to their own risk 
levels (GOI, “Academic Paper” 5-6).  
 
The Jamsosnas scheme will be run based on the following principles:9 
- Mutual assistance (gotong royong): wealthier participants will assist those who are 
less fortunate, those with low risks will help those with high risks, and those who 
are healthier will help those who are sicker; 
- Compulsory membership: all Indonesian residents, in stages, will be required to 
participate in the Jamsosnas scheme; 
- Trust funds: the funds collected from participants will be managed by the 
National Social Security Provider Agencies in a trust fund which will be used 
optimally for the welfare of all participants; 
- Not-for-profit: the management of this trust fund should not be profit oriented 
and the funds should be used to meet the needs of all participants; 
- Openness, risk aversion, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness: these 
management principles will become the basis for the national social security 
program; 
- Portability: participants will continue as members of the national social security 
scheme regardless of their income and employment status, and will continue to 
receive benefits regardless of their income and their position in the family, as long 
as they fulfill the eligibility criteria for receiving these benefits.  
 
The scheme proposed by the government is comprehensive and will consist of 
retirement benefits, healthcare benefits, death benefits, and worker disability benefits.10 
Unlike Jamsostek, which only covers formal private sector workers, Jamsosnas will 
                                                 
9 See the explanatory clauses of the National Social Security Bill  (3-4). 
10 The Indonesian government also plans to create an unemployment insurance scheme. However, it 
has not been included in the current draft of the Jamsosnas bill. 
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cover all Indonesian citizens, regardless of whether they are formal workers, informal 
workers, or self-employed.  
 
While the official contribution rates for the different Jamsosnas schemes are still 
unknown, we could estimate the rates for the Jamsosnas pension and death benefits 
programs based upon the current rates in the Jamsostek scheme, assuming that that 
they will not be much different from the existing contribution rates. The 
contribution rate for the retirement benefits program is estimated to be around 
10.75% of one’s base salary: 4.75% for the old-age pension program (the current 
contribution rate for the Taspen pension scheme) and 6% for the old-age savings 
program (the current contribution rate for the Jamsostek provident fund). 
Contributions will be shared equally by employers and workers. Finally, the death 
benefit program is estimated to be the same as the Jamsosnas death benefit scheme 
(currently 0.3% of one’s base salary). From these figures, we can estimate the total 
cost of the Jamsosnas program (for formal sector workers) will be between 17.29% to 
18.80% of a formal sector worker’s base salary (see Table 2 below). 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Jamsosnas Contributions/Premiums  for Formal Sector Workers 
(% of wages) 
Program 
Total 
Jamsostek 
Contribution 
Rates 
Total  
Known 
Jamsosnas 
Contribution Rates 
Total Jamsosnas 
Contribution 
Rates  
(Estimated) 
Workplace Accident 
Benefits Program  
0.24 – 1.74 
(5 classes) 
0.24 – 1.75 0.24 – 1.75 
Death Benefits Program  
 
0.3 Unknown 
(Paid in full by 
employers) 
0.3 
Retirement Benefits 
Program  
 
5.7 Unknown 
(equal contributions 
for old-age pension 
and old-age savings 
schemes) 
10.75 
(4.75% for old-age 
pension and 6% for 
old-age savings 
schemes) 
Healthcare Benefits Program  3 – 6 6 6 
Total 9.24 – 13.74 6.24-7.75 17.29 – 18.80 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
3.2. Institutional Information 
 
A National Social Security Board will be set up to oversee the program. It will consist of 
15 members, including five representatives from central government ministries and 
agencies (Ministries of Health, Manpower, Social Affairs, Social Welfare, and Finance), 
five from employers’ associations (Indonesian Employers’ Association - Apindo, 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce - Kadin, etc.), and five from labor unions. The 
members will be appointed for a term of three years, which may be renewed for an 
additional three years (GOI, “Academic Paper” 16-17; GOI “Draft” sec. 64). 
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The National Social Security Provider Agencies will manage the Social Security 
funds on a day-to-day basis. Responsibilities of these agencies will include ensuring 
workers make monthly contributions to the national social security fund, issuing 
social security identification numbers to every citizen in Indonesia, and managing the 
national social security fund. The management of these agencies will be appointed 
through shareholder meetings (GOI, “Draft” sec. 49). 
 
The National Social Security Agencies will consist of the different social security 
agencies: PT Jamsostek (which will manage the pension and health insurance 
programs for formal private sector employees), PT Askes (which will manage health 
insurance for civil servants), PT Taspen (which will manage the pension program for 
civil servants) and PT Asabri (which will manage the pension program for those in 
the armed forces). These institutions will continue to operate their respective 
programs, without causing any losses for existing participants in their schemes. These 
institutions will remain for-profit state-owned enterprises (persero).11 However, the 
bill drafters stated that these companies will receive a special status as special perseros 
(persero khusus), whereby they will be obliged to run the National Social Security 
programs on a not-for-profit basis and their social security revenues will not be 
subject to income tax payments (GOI, “Draft” sec. 40- 41). In reality, having persero 
and persero khusus legal status at the same time would be contradictory and many 
legal experts have questioned whether this arrangement would work. In addition to 
the four existing social security companies, a new company will be created to handle 
programs for informal sector workers and recipients of the government’s social 
assistance schemes (GOI, “Draft” sec. 78).  
 
In accordance to the regional autonomy policy that was implemented in Indonesia in 
2001, the regions will be responsible for administering the National Social Security 
Program within their own regions through the branch offices of the National Social 
Security Provider Agencies. Responsibilities delegated to the regions will include 
collecting contributions, distributing benefits to participants, issuing service contracts 
to health service providers, and designing a fee schedule for the different services 
provided by health service providers (GOI, “Academic Paper”  20, 34).  
 
As not all regions will be ready to administer the National Social Security Program at 
the same time, the scheme will be implemented gradually in the regions, depending 
on their readiness to administer the program within their localities. Different social 
security programs will be introduced at different times depending on the needs and 
readiness of local governments. For instance, the health insurance program will be 
introduced before the old-age pension program (GOI, “Academic Paper” 33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The original draft of the National Social Security Bill envisioned that these agencies would be 
converted into a single social insurance agency, which would have been a non-profit entity. However, 
this proposal was dropped in a later version of the draft. 
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3.3. A Description of the Public Pension Programs 
 
The public pension program will comprise of two components in Indonesia: the 
public pension program and the old-age savings program. Each of these programs will 
be discussed below. 
 
3.3.1. The Old-Age Pension Program 
 
The old-age pension program is a long-term program where participants make regular 
contributions so that an additional income is available to offset a reduction in or loss of 
income after retirement. It is a defined-benefit social insurance program,12 and it will 
presumably operate as a partially funded pay-as-you-go scheme.13 As stipulated in the draft 
law, this program will only accumulate social security contributions for the first 15 years, and 
will only start paying pension benefits to retirees after this (GOI, “Draft” sec. 34).  
 
This old-age pension scheme has similar features to the publicly-run pension 
programs established in most developed countries in Western Europe and North 
America, and to the monthly pension program run by PT Taspen for retired civil 
servants and their widows/widowers. The program will be further divided into four 
components: old-age pensions, disability pensions, widow/widower pensions, and 
child pensions, (GOI, “Draft” sec. 34).  
 
The defined benefit of the old-age pension should normally be a percentage of the 
average income from the previous year. The fixed minimum pension under the 
proposed plan has been set at 70% of the minimum wage. The same benefit level also 
applies to the disability pension program. Widows/widowers and children will receive 
a minimum pension of between 40% and 60% of the local minimum wage (GOI, 
“Academic Paper” 59-60). Widows/widows will continue to receive pension benefits 
until they die, remarry, or start working full-time. Children will continue to receive 
pension benefits until they marry, start working full-time, or reach 23 years of age, 
whichever comes first (GOI, “Draft” sec. 34). 
 
According to the draft academic paper, the contribution level for the pension program 
will be set differently for formal sector workers and informal sector workers. 
Contributions from formal sector workers will subsidize the pensions received by informal 
                                                 
12 A defined benefit scheme is a retirement plan in which workers are guaranteed a benefit upon 
retirement, usually based on years of service, age, and final or lifetime earnings. The 
government/employers are responsible for funding the plan’s promised benefits and are liable for the 
risks associated with the scheme. An alternative is the defined contribution scheme, that is a retirement 
plan in which only the contribution rates and bases of benefits calculations are determined in advance 
(not the benefit level). The benefit is a direct product of the contributions paid to the investment 
accounts, plus the return on investments from these accounts. The risks, though not the control, of 
this pension scheme rest with the workers (ILO, xxii; Weller, 3-4). 
13 A pay-as-you-go system is a social security system in which no funds are set aside in advance and 
benefits for current retirees plus administrative costs are paid out of the current workers’ contributions 
(ILO, “Academic Paper” xxii). A partially funded pay-as-you-go scheme means that the system is 
partially financed in advance to create a reserve fund for future use by retirees but does not pay 
contributions at the present. After the system matures, it would start paying out pension obligation to 
retirees and then it could return as a full pay-as-you-go scheme.  
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sector workers. The paper stipulates that contributions from formal sector workers will be 
shared with their employers on a 50:50 basis. Employers will be responsible for collecting 
worker contributions and submitting them to the National Social Security Provider 
Agency. Informal workers and those who are self-employed will contribute a flat-rate 
amount to be determined later. The government plans to cover pensions for those who 
are too poor to contribute to the scheme through subsidies from the state budget (GOI, 
“Academic Paper” 22; GOI, ”Draft” sec. 7, subsec. 5). 
 
The retirement age is currently 55, and a worker who has contributed to the scheme 
for at least fifteen years will be entitled to receive full pension benefits from the 
program. These workers, or inheritors if a worker dies before reaching retirement age, 
will receive monthly pension payments. Workers that retire before reaching the 
fifteen years’ contribution requirement above, will be entitled to receive the 
accumulated amount of their pension contributions, plus the investment returns, in a 
lump sum. However, they will not be eligible to receive a monthly pension (GOI, 
“Academic Paper” 56; GOI, “Draft” sec. 34).  
 
3.3.2. The Old-Age Savings Program 
 
The old-age savings program is a long-term program in which participants will be 
entitled to receive benefits before or upon reaching retirement age and, in the event 
of the death of a participant, his or her spouse, children, or official inheritors will be 
entitled to receive benefits. It will be a compulsory savings program. Thus, it will be 
similar to the compulsory savings program run by PT Jamsostek for private formal 
sector workers and their families. In other words, it is a fully-funded, defined 
contribution pension program similar to the mandatory individual retirement 
account schemes in countries that have adopted the second pillar recommended by 
the World Bank (World Bank), with one important exception: according to the draft 
bill, this pension scheme will be run by a public social security agency instead of 
private investment companies.  
 
The benefits of this pension plan will be provided as a lump-sum payment if a worker 
dies, becomes permanently disabled, or retires. If a worker dies or becomes 
permanently disabled, benefits will go to their inheritors (spouses and children under 
the age of 23). The total amount of program benefits received by members is the 
entire amount of their contribution accumulated over the years plus the investment 
returns on their contribution. At the earliest, workers may start withdrawing money 
from their account five years before they reach retirement age. They may even use a 
portion of the money saved in their account as a loan after they have made 
contributions for a given period of time, the details of which will be stipulated in a 
future government regulation (GOI, “Draft” sec. 30). 
 
Each member must contribute either a percentage of their income (formal workers) 
or a flat-rate amount (informal and self-employed workers) to this savings program. 
Contributions from formal workers will be split equally between themselves and their 
employers. The National Social Security Provider Agency will be required to provide 
an annual report to each worker on their accumulated contribution and investment 
returns. Exactly how the government plans to invest the funds collected by this 
scheme will be stipulated in a future government regulation (GOI, “Draft” sec. 31). 
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3.4. The National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
As a part of national social security reform, the government plans to create a 
National Health Insurance (NHI) program that will theoretically cover health 
expenditures for all Indonesian residents. It is based on the principles of social justice, 
social assistance, and universal/compulsory participation (GOI, “Academic Paper” 
27). All Indonesian residents will have to contribute to this scheme, including upper-
income Indonesians and foreigners working in Indonesia, groups that are presumably 
already a part of good health insurance schemes. 
 
The program will be implemented in stages, first for formal sector workers and then 
for informal and self-employed workers. Formal sector workers must pay a 6% payroll 
tax, split equally with their employers. Retirees will also pay the 6% tax and this will 
be deducted from their pension. Exact contributions from self-employed and informal 
sector workers will be decided on at a latter date. The government will pay 
contributions for those with a low income or who are unemployed (GOI, “Academic 
Paper” 41). It is unclear whether this will be the responsibility of the central 
government or the local governments. The law defines “low-income participants” as 
those whose income is lower than the regional minimum wage (UMR) in the district 
where they live (GOI, “Academic Paper” 6). 
 
The NHI program is designed to provide comprehensive health benefits, ranging 
from preventive treatments such as immunization and family planning to treatment 
for catastrophic illnesses such as heart and kidney diseases (GOI, “Draft” explanation 
to sec. 13, subsection (1)). The law defines standard health services as primary health 
services, referral services, and other supporting health services. Primary health 
services are services that are provided through the government’s health service 
facilities, and include general practitioners, dentists, medical facilities, mother and 
child health facilities, maternity hospitals, and other primary health facilities 
(provided by the private sector). For in-patient services, the health benefit is 
equivalent to health services in class II private hospitals. Referral health services are 
health services provided by specialists, dentists, hospitals, and other specialist health 
service facilities. Finally, other health services include prescription drugs, 
laboratories, and other services (including prenatal-postnatal services) (GOI, 
“Academic Paper” 24). 
 
The government plans to compensate providers using the capitation-based 
reimbursement system, mainly through the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) scheme.14 
Services will be delivered by both public and private hospitals and health clinics, as long 
as they agree to the terms of conditions stipulated in the service contracts they sign with 
the National Health Insurance Provider Agency (GOI, “Academic Paper” 40). 
However, there is no requirement for service providers to provide health services to NHI 
participants seeking treatment in their facilities. Thus, some providers might choose not 
to sign contracts with the National Health Insurance Provider Agency and therefore not 
accept patients covered solely by the NHI scheme.  
                                                 
14 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) are categories of illnesses and treatment types defined by the 
National Health System. They determine how much a hospital/clinic will be paid for an individual’s 
treatment under a capitation-based reimbursement system (Rosen, 331). 
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The NHI program will be administered by the National Health Insurance Provider 
Agency, which will be supervised by the National Social Security Board. Its functions 
will include determining general policy regarding the implementation of the NHI 
program, selecting health service providers, and making payments directly or 
indirectly to health service providers for medical services provided to participants 
(GOI, “Academic Paper” 38). The agency’s management will be appointed for a 
period of five years at the agency’s shareholders meetings (GOI, “Draft” sec. 54). 
 
In accordance with regional autonomy policy, the National Health Insurance 
Provider Agency will establish regional offices. These branches will be set up based 
on the readiness of the regions to administer the program, although the 
implementation of the NHI program in the regions will receive higher priority than 
the other Social Security Programs (GOI, “Academic Paper” 33). Regional offices 
will have broad authorities in implementing the NHI program in their regions, 
including the authority to: 
 
1) determine the level of investment of social security funds in the regions; 
2) issue service contracts to health service providers; and 
3) create fee schedules which will determine the payments to health service 
providers for the services they provide (GOI, “Academic Draft” 34). 
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED INDONESIAN 
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM BILL 
 
 
4.1. A General Analysis  
 
Based on the results of our analysis of the current National Social Security Reform 
draft bill (dated January 16, 2004), we can make the following conclusions. Actuarial 
calculations which provide a sound basis for determining contribution levels and the 
real benefits of the scheme have not been included in the draft law, and there have 
not been any reliable economic analyses on the short and long-term impact of this 
scheme on the labor market, Indonesia’s business competitiveness, and the 
Indonesian economy in general. In the absence of such analyses, the impact of this 
scheme on the economy remains questionable and the adequacy of the proposed 
contribution rate in paying actual program benefits remains doubtful.  
 
The National Social Security Program (consisting of public pension, NHI, workplace 
injury, and death benefit schemes) would also become a significant financial burden 
for employers and workers, since they will be expected to contribute between 18% 
and 20% of workers’ wages, which would be a 5% to 7% increase from the current 
Jamsostek contribution rate. Thus, the Jamsosnas scheme could create a substantial 
burden for formal employers and workers and could further reduce the 
competitiveness of Indonesia’s business climate, as it creates substantial new labor 
costs for companies. As a result, there could be significant incentives for employers to 
shift the cost of these contributions to workers by lowering their take-home pay and 
benefits and reducing the number of employees, which means that in practice, the 
total cost of paying for these schemes would be solely born by workers. This could 
reduce the income of low-middle income workers who rely on this salary.  
 
According to the Jamsosnas academic paper (GOI), contributions from formal sector 
workers will be set at a much higher rate than that from informal sector workers and 
the self-employed, since it is assumed that the payroll tax paid by the former group 
will subsidize the social security benefits of the latter groups. However, the draft bill 
does not clearly define or explain this cross-subsidization scheme. Thus, the new 
social security scheme would become less attractive for these workers and the 
incentives for evasion could be substantial (e.g., switching to the informal sector 
where the contribution  rates are much lower).  
 
It is also questionable as to whether workers who work in the formal sector (one third 
of Indonesian workers) can fully subsidize those in the informal sector. Experiences in 
other developing countries show that similar social security programs only cover a 
small proportion of the workforce. For instance, the Philippines has had a social 
security program for 45 years and whereas about 72% of the workforce are members of 
the pension program, only 28% of these workers actually pay their compulsory 
contributions (Capulong). 
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In addition, past attempts to collect social security contributions from informal sector 
workers, both in Indonesia and other developing countries,15 have shown that it is 
very difficult, if not impossible. This is because many informal workers are very 
mobile in terms of their place of work, the type of jobs they undertake, and where 
they live. Thus, trying to find a particular worker in the informal sector from one 
month to the next in order to collect their social security contribution is probably a 
futile exercise. As a result, many informal workers are not covered by any social 
security scheme, either because tax collectors cannot contact them or because they 
fail to claim the social security benefits they are entitled to, even though they have 
made some contribution to the scheme. As a result, informal sector workers continue 
to be excluded from publicly-sponsored social security schemes, despite many arguing 
that they are the ones who need social security protection the most.  
 
The program could also have significant managerial and governance problems. Even 
though the National Social Security Board will consist of representatives of the 
government, employers’ associations and workers, most of the board members will 
come from government ministries and agencies. Additionally, the proposal does not 
address the possibility of collusion and nepotism during the selection process, so the 
government could appoint private sector and labor representatives who support the 
interests of government bureaucrats. As a result, board members representing 
employers and workers might not necessarily work in the interests of these groups. 
 
The program will continue to be administered by several state-owned enterprises, which 
will be established as for-profit corporations and be obliged to contribute to the 
government’s budget. Current social security schemes administered by for-profit state 
enterprises have failed to provide adequate benefits to beneficiaries because of the small 
number of people they cover, relatively small benefits, low investment returns, and poor 
governance. It is doubtful that the new social security scheme will be different from 
previous government programs if it is administered by the same state-owned enterprises 
without any fundamental change.  
 
Finally, the government’s proposal disregards the role of competition in providing 
social security benefits to Indonesians, as according to the bill, the government will 
be solely responsible for social security provision, in spite of the fact that most formal 
sector workers already obtain adequate health and retirement benefits from their 
employers. The government alone will continue to make decisions on how the fund 
is managed, invested, and distributed among beneficiaries, while workers themselves 
will not be allowed to participate in the decision-making relating to the trust fund, 
even though it is actually their own money and most Indonesians workers have little 
confidence in publicly-run social security schemes.  
 
 
                                                 
15 In 2002/03, PT Jamsostek conducted a pilot project that attempted to collect Jamsostek 
contributions from informal sector workers. However, due to the many difficulties it found in 
collecting contributions from them, it has now postponed this project. It now states that the 
responsibility to collect social security contributions from informal sector workers should be done by 
another government entity (Schroeder-Butterfill, 65). 
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Evidence from other countries (notably Latin American and Eastern European 
countries) shows that entrusting the operation of the national social security system 
to the same party that regulates it (i.e., the government) simply does not work. The 
government-run social security programs in these countries are always prone to empty 
promises of generous benefits that the governments are not able to accomplish 
financially, and continued corruption and abuse of social security funds by officials. 
This indicates that it is not a good idea for the government to regulate as well as 
operate the national social security scheme. These functions need to be separated in 
order to have a truly functional social security system that is beneficial for workers.  
 
4.2.  An Analysis of the Proposed Public Pension Scheme  
 
4.2.1. The Old-Age Pension Scheme 
 
The proposed Indonesian old-age pension scheme has been designed as a social 
insurance system, which will operate as a partially-funded, pay-as-you-go defined 
benefit program. It will be a compulsory, universal insurance program for all 
Indonesian residents, regardless of their nationality and working status. As a 
compulsory insurance program, the scheme will avoid the problem of adverse 
selection,16 since no one will be able to opt out of it and choose an alternative 
pension plan. However, it could suffer from moral hazards,17 in which workers might 
cut their savings because they believe they will receive pension benefits when they 
retire. Thus, overall welfare of workers could worsen with public social security since 
they may have little private savings to supplement their income from the public 
pension scheme. 
 
The defined benefit system adopted by the scheme would place significant financial risks 
on employers and the government, because they might have to be responsible for making 
additional contributions to the scheme in case it runs into serious financial problems.18 In 
the case of Indonesia, there is a high probability of the program running into deficit, 
because it will offer very generous pension benefits, with a minimum benefit of 70% of 
the local minimum wage. Since many Indonesian workers, especially those who work in 
the informal sector, have earnings below the local minimum wage, many of them will 
receive this guaranteed benefit. Due to the substantial liability, the possibility of serious 
financial problems in this pension scheme in the future is quite high. 
 
In addition, the fact that the benefits of the old-age pension scheme seem to be 
determined based upon the minimum wage could create additional demands from 
workers and labor unions for the government and employers to increase the minimum 
                                                 
16 Adverse selection is a situation in which only people who feel the need to be protected from a given 
risk (e.g., loss of earnings due to death, disease or accident) are willing to obtain insurance, while those 
who do not feel this need do not. This negates the purpose of insurance, which tries to spread this risk 
amongst all members. 
17 Moral hazard is a situation in which individuals are more willing to pursue riskier activities because 
participate in an insurance scheme.  
18 Section 42 of the Jamsosnas Bill states that the government could adopt extraordinary actions to 
maintain the financial solvency of the NSSPA, for instance, bailing out NSSPA if they become 
financially insolvent or bankrupt. 
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wage, so that workers can earn higher pension benefits. If the government was to give in 
to such pressures, it would incur additional pension liabilities in the future, something 
that could further endanger the government’s fiscal position and sustainability in the 
future, when the time comes for the government to start paying pension benefits. In 
2003 and 2004, the local minimum wage (UMR) increased between 10-15% on average. 
If this trend continues we can expect pension benefits and therefore costs to rise between 
10-15%, whereas inflation would be around 6-7% per annum.  
 
In addition, the government’s plan to subsidize the coverage of low-income persons is 
also questionable. According to the draft law, Indonesians whose income falls below 
the UMR will be considered as "low-income" earners and therefore will be eligible to 
receive a government subsidy to help cover their Jamsosnas contribution. However, 
there is a substantial number of Indonesians who earn less than the UMR, especially 
those who work in the informal sector or are not permanently employed. If there 
were too many Indonesians eligible to receive this subsidy, the government would 
have to commit significant resources to cover this subsidy. Consequently, this could 
put significant financial strain on the government budget. It is not clear whether the 
government plans to pay for this subsidy using general revenues or other channels 
such as surpluses generated by the investment of the National Social Security Trust 
Fund. It is also unclear how the government will allocate this subsidy to the 
recipients (direct payments to beneficiaries, payments to health providers, etc). If this 
issue is not addressed, it could become another factor that could raise doubts over the 
long-term sustainability of the national social security program. 
 
In addition, the proposal seems to fail to take into account that the Indonesian 
population is aging rapidly. It is estimated that the proportion of Indonesians over 55 
years will increase from about 10% of the population in the year 2000 (about 23 
million) to about 30% by 2050 (about 100 million) (”Indonesia”). At the same time, 
the Indonesian population aged 65 years and older will rise dramatically during this 
period, from 10 million in 2000 (4.5% of the population) to 60.5 million in 2050 
(18% of the population) (”Indonesia”). Thus, the elderly will be more of a burden to 
Indonesian families (and taxpayers) by the year 2050. 
 
The combination of a relatively young retirement age (55 years), low number of 
working years to qualify for pensions (15 years) and a rapidly aging population, is a 
recipe for disaster for any public pension program, and it seems that this proposed 
scheme will suffer from such a fate and become financially unsustainable. Attempts to 
correct the problem such as raising contributions and cutting pension benefits are 
only temporary fixes that will make the program less attractive to participants. 
Eventually, the pension scheme could suffer from a default, which would place 
significant financial liabilities on the government and employers as well as result in a 
significant loss of retirement income for workers. 
 
Experiences from other developing countries such as the Philippines show that the 
liabilities of social security pension funds could be substantial. In the Philippines, the 
number of new retirees eligible for pension benefits more than doubled in the 1990s. 
This caused the funds accumulated in the country’s social security trust fund to decline 
significantly, so that it is now predicted that the fund will be completely depleted by the 
year 2015. If this occurs, the Philippines social security system will run into significant 
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financial problems – the hidden public pension debt is estimated to be about US$21 
billion (Rp200 trillion) (Capulong). We could predict that if the same situation occurs 
in Indonesia, which has a population about three times larger than the Philippines, the 
Indonesian government and eventually Indonesian citizens, would be obliged to pay a 
substantial number of new debts that could be up to three times larger than the debt 
incurred by the Philippines’ social security system (around US$ 63 billion or about 
Rp598 trillion). Since Indonesia has a large amount of public debt (estimated at US$136 
billion or around Rp1.292 trillion) as of March 2004 (“Central Bank”), this country 
cannot afford an extra Rp598 trillion in debt.  
 
Finally, it is estimated that the impact of the proposed Jamsosnas old-age pension 
scheme on the current Indonesian elderly population would be minimal. Since the 
system is a partially funded pay-as-you-go scheme, unless they make contributions, the 
current retirees will not benefit at all. Although it is the current poor retirees that need 
Jamsosnas old-age pension scheme the most, they do not have the financial resources 
to contribute to the scheme. 
 
People who retire between when the Jamsosnas pension scheme takes effect and when it 
will start paying pensions (about fifteen years after its establishment according to the 
draft law) will also not benefit from the Jamsosnas pension scheme. As stipulated in the 
draft law (GOI, “Draft” sec. 34, subsection (5)), they will not be eligible to receive a 
pension. They will only receive the money accumulated in their old-age savings accounts 
(contribution plus investment earnings).19 However, in general, only those who retire 
fifteen years after the Jamsosnas pension scheme has been in place and have made regular 
contributions to the scheme will receive pension benefits. 
 
Thus, unlike what has been claimed by the proponents of the Jamsosnas bill, the 
Jamsosnas pension scheme will not be very helpful for current retirees who do not 
have the resources to contribute to the scheme. However, this group is still 
vulnerable to old-age poverty, if not more so compared with future retirees that will 
have participated in the Jamsosnas pension scheme. Consequently, the government 
might have to establish a separate pension or income support scheme for this group.  
 
4.2.2. The Old-Age Savings Scheme 
 
Since the proposed old-age savings scheme is similar in many ways to the current 
Jamsostek provident fund scheme (both are fully funded, defined contribution schemes 
fully paid from workers’ contributions), we can look at the experiences of the Jamsostek 
scheme in anticipating the problems in the new old-age savings scheme. As stipulated 
in section II, the Jamsostek scheme suffers from a low participation rate, a low 
compliance rate, low investment returns, as well as poor governance and offers few 
benefits. These factors have significantly reduced the real value of the Jamsostek 
scheme as a possible source of income for its participants. Thus, many participants do 
not regard Jamsostek as a reliable source for their post retirement income. 
                                                 
19 The only exception is when a worker dies before reaching retirement age or has contributed to the 
Jamsosnas pension scheme for fifteen years. In these cases, their inheritors (surviving spouse and 
children) will continue to receive their pension benefits until they die or start working full-time (or for 
the children, when they reach 23 years of age) (GOI, “Draft” sec. 34, subsection (4) and (7)). 
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One lesson we could draw from Jamsostek is that without significantly reforming the 
financial and managerial governance of the current old-age savings program, it is unlikely 
that the performance, investment return, and benefits of the new scheme will improve 
significantly. This would make the proposed old-age savings scheme unattractive to 
participants and, like with Jamsostek today, they would not regard it as a potential source 
of their old age income and would continue to rely on private voluntary savings schemes.  
 
4.3. An Analysis of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
The NHI scheme is the most ambitious of the government’s current efforts to extend 
health insurance coverage to all Indonesians, something that the government has 
never done before. Given that in the past, the government’s involvement in the 
healthcare sector was minimal, spending only 0.6% of the national GDP on health 
care in 2000 (UNDP), the proposed NHI scheme is a dramatic expansion. 
 
While the government’s efforts to implement this scheme have been commendable, 
there are several questions that could be raised regarding the proposed plan. First, 
many questions have been asked about the exact financing of the scheme and 
whether the benefits offered by the program will be adequate in comparison to the 
contribution rates one must pay. The 6% contribution rate for the health scheme is 
higher than contributions in East Asian countries that have adopted similar NHI 
schemes, such as Thailand and South Korea.20  This is a substantial financial burden 
for formal sector workers and their employers, which would significantly reduce their 
take-home pay, because it is assumed that employers would reduce salaries in order to 
pay for their share of the payroll tax. It is also questionable as to whether Indonesian 
workers who work in the formal sector could fully subsidize health insurance for 
informal sector workers or two-thirds of Indonesian workers. 
 
The types of health services that would be covered by the NHI scheme are also unclear. 
The government has stated that not all health services will be fully covered by the NHI 
program, and thus to pay for these services, participants are expected to obtain coverage 
from private health insurance providers or pay them out-of-pocket (GOI, “Academic 
Paper” 37). Neither the Jamsosnas draft law nor its accompanying academic paper 
explicitly state what health services are going to be covered by the program or what 
services are not going to be covered. There have been suggestions that the NHI scheme 
will follow the guidelines established by the World Health Organization (WHO). If this 
is correct, the services covered by the program will be quite limited and many new 
modern treatments will not be covered by it. In other countries, NHI schemes normally 
pay for both standard and extra/additional services.21  
 
                                                 
20 For instance, the contribution rate for the NHI scheme in Thailand is only 3% of payroll and the 
contribution rate for the for the NHI scheme in South Korea is about 4% of payroll. The benefits 
offered in these countries seem to be much more comprehensive than the benefits to be offered in the 
Indonesian program. For details, see U.S. Social Security Administration (1999). 
21 However, it must be stated that most of these countries (notably those in Europe and North America) 
have experienced difficulties in fulfilling the obligation to pay the cost of their national health services in 
full. Most of them have plans to shift some of the cost of paying for these services by requiring participants 
to pay some of the costs for more expensive treatments via co-insurance and deductible charges.  
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Thus, it is reasonable to question whether the Indonesian NHI scheme really 
provides good value for its participants, given the high contribution rates required to 
fund it and the low level of benefits offered by the scheme. One estimation (Bird) 
found that the average benefit for recipients would be around Rp188,000 per person 
(assuming that only formal sector workers contribute and receive benefits). If the 
program were extended to include the entire population without contributions from 
informal sector workers (because their coverage is subsidized through the state 
budget), then the average benefit would be reduced to Rp52,000 per person, an 
amount so small that the benefits would be inadequate in paying for the healthcare 
expenses of NHI participants. 
 
Another valid question is whether all healthcare providers in Indonesia (both in the 
public and private sector) are willing to participate in the scheme. The draft law does not 
require all health providers in Indonesia to participate in the scheme. Given that most 
health providers in Indonesia are paid on a fee-for-service basis rather than a 
prospective/capitation fee reimbursement scheme, many of them would naturally prefer 
the former and it is feared that many of these providers would decline to treat patients 
relying exclusively on the NHI scheme, insisting that they have to pay for the services 
not covered by the NHI scheme in full before they could be admitted by these providers.  
 
It is feared that most private hospitals and health clinics will not participate in the 
scheme and thus only public hospitals and health centers will join it, because they are 
required by the government to do so. If the above assumption is proven correct, both 
the choice and the quality of treatment available to patients will be severely limited. 
This is a strong possibility, given that in the past, most health providers were not 
willing to join the Askes and Jamsostek health schemes due to the fact that they used 
a capitation-based reimbursement system instead of a fee-for-service system. Providers 
argued that under such a system, the amount of money reimbursed would be much 
lower than the actual costs incurred, forcing them to bear substantial losses from 
providing health services to patients who are members of these schemes. 
 
It is also questionable as to whether the contributions mandated by law at present (6% 
for formal sector workers) would be sufficient in meeting the future health expenditures 
of Indonesians, especially if one considers that the Indonesian population will age quite 
rapidly within the next few decades or so. Since older people tend to generate higher 
health expenditures than younger people, the cost of providing adequate health care for 
elderly Indonesians will increase significantly. It is doubtful that the current contribution 
rate will cover health expenses for all Indonesians during the next few decades. Higher 
contribution rates would be required, which would increase the burden for workers and 
employers and could cause the Indonesian economy, already less competitive compared 
with our neighbors today due to the presence of many legal and illegal taxes and fees, to 
become even less competitive.  
 
Finally, the current government plan seems to be very ambitious in wanting to 
achieve universal healthcare coverage for all Indonesians within a very short period 
of time (less than a decade). While this goal is commendable, realistically, the 
process to achieve universal health coverage in many countries often takes a very 
long time. For instance, it took 24 years for South Korea (from 1976 to 2000) to 
achieve universal health coverage for its citizens (Kwon). Thailand created its NHI 
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scheme in 1990, but only in 1999 was it fully functional, and it will take many years 
for the scheme to achieve its goal of providing universal health coverage while at the 
same time also remaining financially sustainable (Asher). Anyone who expects that 
universal health coverage can be achieved within a short time period is seriously 
being misled and without taking this fact into account, the process of implementing 
the NHI scheme in a very short period of time could have disastrous results.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1. General Conclusions  
 
Indonesia is at a crucial stage in its attempt to extend social security coverage to 
Indonesian workers and reform its current social security scheme so that it works 
better for the workers in the system. The current social security system is not 
sustainable and has not been successful in providing adequate benefits to participants, 
thanks to a relatively low rate of worker participation in the scheme, low rate of 
return on the national social security fund, and poor management of the scheme. 
Therefore, many parties acknowledge that a fundamental overhaul of the system is 
badly needed. 
 
The current Indonesian social security reform proposal as stated in the draft of the 
National Social Security Reform Bill could create a disincentive for Indonesian 
workers to save, does not treat all workers equally, sets up a benefit level that is too 
generous and could endanger the fiscal sustainability of the government. In addition, 
the program does not take into account the country’s rapidly aging population, which 
could put additional fiscal strain on the government, and ignores the potential for 
poor governance and management. All of these issues could jeopardize the health and 
retirement prospects of Indonesian workers and could force them to live below the 
poverty line after they have retired.  
 
In most countries in the world, publicly financed social security schemes are no longer 
viewed as ideal. Many of these countries have pursued other alternatives to achieve 
universal social security coverage for their citizens and at the same time maintain 
competition and choice. Financing and providing social security should no longer be 
regarded as a government monopoly. There are many cases in which the involvement of 
the private sector in the provision of social security could positively improve service 
delivery, promote competition and innovation that would improve social security 
provision, and eventually, improve health and retirement outcomes for participants.  
 
Many developed and developing countries have introduced reforms to overcome the 
financial problems inherent in defined benefit pension schemes. Recent reforms 
adopted in many other countries are built around “three pillars” that provide old-age 
pensions and health insurance.22 Indonesia could learn from these international 
experiences with pension reforms. The three-pillar strategy is based on the following 
principles:  
 
• The first pillar is a public pillar that provides a social safety net – this resembles 
existing public pension plans such, as Jamsostek, but it is smaller and focuses on 
providing a social safety net for the elderly, particularly those whose lifetime 
incomes were low. 
 
                                                 
22 For further details on the three-pillar system, see World Bank (1994).  
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• The second pillar is a program fully managed and funded by the private sector which 
handles mandatory retirement schemes and insurance for participants – linking 
benefits to contributions as in a defined contribution plan. Under a defined 
contribution plan, a worker’s pension is linked to his/her contributions plus the return 
on investment. This program is fiscally sustainable in the long run as benefits are tied 
to worker’s contributions and therefore avoids pension costs in the state budget. 
 
• The third is a voluntary pillar for people who want a higher income in old age. The 
three-pillar approach allows private sector participation to diversify risk. Workers and 
employers have the option to choose a social security program that is suitable for 
their own needs and wants. The government can design a mandatory social security 
program but it is not necessary for the government to run the program as a 
monopoly. The program could be run cooperatively by state enterprises, private 
sector enterprises, and not-for-profit organizations (NGOs).  However, experiences 
show that the program would earn better returns for its participants if it were run by 
the private sector. The three-pillar option includes both public and private sector 
management. This is a safe social policy as it spreads risks among different providers. 
 
The government also plays an important role in two ways: 
 First, to ensure implementation and enforcement of necessary regulations and to 
establish prudent financial regulations for pension funds.  
 Second, to provide a separate social assistance program to help the poorest citizens 
who are no longer able to work. This would be funded through the national budget.  
 
Countries that have accomplished the above reform scheme include Argentina, 
Chile, and Mexico (developing countries); Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland 
(former socialist countries); and Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom (developed countries). In addition, several other countries such as Brazil, 
China, and India (developing countries); Russia (former socialist country); and Italy, 
Singapore, and the United States (developed countries) have either planned or have 
already started to reform their national social security schemes using the above 
methods. In virtually every country that has adopted the three-pillar social security 
system, it has been credited in raising economic growth, competitiveness, the saving 
rate, and program benefits, as well as improving the business climate, and thus has 
increased the welfare of participants (and citizens).23 
 
5.2. Reforming the National Pension Scheme 
 
The current world trends in pension provisions are characterized by a shift from a pay-as-you-
go pension scheme to a fully funded one, and from a publicly run system to a privately run 
one, and from the increasingly recognized economic fact that the government cannot serve 
as both the regulator and provider of a given public service. As seen in case studies, numerous 
developing (and developed) countries have successfully reformed their public pension 
schemes using the three-pillar paradigm, and thus increased worker confidence in the 
scheme, increased their investment returns, and improved the governance of schemes. 
Therefore, the Indonesian government should seriously consider changing its public pension 
scheme into a privately managed pension scheme based on the three-pillar paradigm. 
                                                 
23 For instance, see Fox and Palmer (1999).  
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As a matter of fact, Indonesia already has the foundation for an individual retirement 
account scheme, because, the current provident fund scheme under the Jamsostek 
program is similar to individual accounts in many ways, since both schemes are fully 
funded and non-redistributive in nature and have defined contributions. The only major 
difference is that the provident fund scheme is managed by a government entity (PT 
Jamsostek), while the individual account scheme is managed by the private sector. While 
the government scheme has many problems, it is estimated that these problems would be 
minimized under private management. Additionally, due to the fact that Indonesia 
already has a defined contribution, fully funded retirement scheme, the transition from 
public to private management would be smoother compared to countries switching from 
a pay-as-you-go, defined benefit, publicly managed pension scheme to a fully funded, 
defined contribution, privately managed scheme. Thus, public pension reform in 
Indonesia would be less painful than the reform process in most European and Latin 
American countries, which mostly use the latter pension scheme.  
 
In this private scheme, workers should be given the choice to either manage their 
accounts by themselves with assistance from a financial management firm or have 
their accounts managed by their employer. At the same time, appropriate regulations 
to safeguard workers’ investments for their retirement need to be issued and enforced 
by the government. Such regulations should be kept to a reasonable level to prevent 
the government from intervening in the management of public pension funds while 
at the same time should ensure the safety of these funds from possible fraud, waste, 
and abuse. For this reason, the government should also possess the capacity and 
political will to enforce these regulations without any biases or prejudices towards any 
parties in order to maintain worker confidence in the system.  
 
5.3. Reforming the National Healthcare Scheme 
 
The same also goes for national healthcare reform. Instead of requiring citizens to 
participate in a government-run national health scheme, with high contribution rates 
but low benefits, that would reduce the country’s competitiveness in comparison to 
neighboring countries, the government should use incentives to induce people to 
purchase private health insurance. This could include a tax credit to help pay health 
insurance premiums or a medical savings account plan set up by private financial 
firms in which workers could save a portion of their salaries, and if they made 
withdrawals from this account for their healthcare needs, they would not be subjected 
to any taxes or fees.  
 
Health policy experts have advocated the creation of a public-private partnership in 
healthcare provision, in which the government delegates some of its responsibilities in 
healthcare (such as providing health services) to the private (both not-for-profit and for-
profit) sector, while maintaining its functions to collect contributions and issue 
regulations. There are many developing countries that have been successful in creating 
such a partnership at the same time as achieving near-universal health coverage for their 
citizens, such as Chile, Columbia, and Venezuela.24 Another policy that could be pursued 
by the government is promoting the creation of microhealth insurance schemes and 
community/occupational health funds for informal sector workers.  
                                                 
24 For details, see Jutting (2002) and Van Ginneken (2003).  
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Such policies would help obtain universal health coverage for all Indonesians while 
at the same time promote competition and innovation in the country’s healthcare 
market as well as increase the competitiveness of the Indonesian economy. This is 
appropriate because the private sector has already played a major role in the 
Indonesian healthcare system. Thus, they have to be given a significant role in the 
country’s efforts to achieve universal healthcare coverage. 
 
Finally, since most Indonesian workers still work in the informal sector, special 
consideration needs to be given to informal sector workers. A universal healthcare 
coverage scheme should incorporate the needs of informal sector workers living in 
different regions and settings in Indonesia. Thus, it is preferable for this scheme to be 
decentralized so that local conditions and needs can be accommodated. It is also 
preferable for the scheme to be established by a given community or an association of 
workers in a similar profession (e.g., an association of becak drivers, food peddlers, etc.) to 
create common links between individuals working in such professions/communities. 
Thus, the scheme would be truly in the interests and needs of the workers/communities. 
 
5.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In short, the time is right to simultaneously extend social security coverage to both 
formal and informal sector workers in Indonesia and reform the existing social security 
system through competition and private sector participation to help Indonesia meet 
the goal of providing social security provisions for all Indonesian citizens and a system 
that works better for all Indonesians. If this reform is successfully accomplished, it is 
hoped that Indonesia will truly become a joyful and prosperous nation as our founding 
fathers envisioned when they declared independence. 
The SMERU Research Institute, September 2004 28 
APPENDIX 
Figure 1: Comparison Between Defined Benefit Social Security Schemes And 
Defined Contribution Schemes 
Issues 
Defined Benefit Social 
Security Scheme as Proposed 
by the Jamsosnas Draft Bill 
A Hypothetical Defined 
Contribution Social Security 
Scheme under the “three-
pillar” paradigm 
Funding system Partially funded pay-as-you-go 
system, which will be funded 
until the trust fund matures. 
Then it will revert to a full pay-
as-you-go scheme in which 
current pensioner benefits are 
subsidized by current worker 
contributions. 
Fully funded system, where 
pensioner benefits are derived 
solely from contributions they 
paid during their working years, 
plus any investment returns. No 
intergenerational cross-subsidy.  
Who manages the 
funds/assets 
Government monopoly. Role of 
the private sector is minimal or 
nonexistent.  
Could be administered 
competitively by government 
enterprises, the private sector, 
and the non-profit sector, but it 
is usually most effective under 
private sector management.  
Aging population  Vulnerable, since the increase 
in the number of pensioners 
occurs at the same time as the 
decline in the number of 
younger workers.  Eventually, 
the system would not be 
financially sustainable because it 
benefits would outweigh 
contributions.  
This problem is largely avoided, 
because participants fund 
themselves, so there is no cross-
subsidy from the younger 
generation (workers) to the 
older generation (pensioners).  
Links between 
benefits and the 
minimum wage 
(UMR) 
Both are closely interlinked, 
thus, program expenditure 
would increase if the minimum 
wage were increased. Inevitably, 
the system would not be 
financially sustainable, because 
benefits would outweigh 
contributions. 
This problem is avoided, 
because there is no relationship 
between the two. 
 
Impact on fiscal 
sustainability/state 
budget 
Very large, since any subsidies 
for participants or the program 
itself would come from the state 
budget. As a result, the 
country’s fiscal sustainability 
could be threatened.  
 
No impact, because there is no 
requirement for the government 
to pay subsidies to the program, 
as the program would be funded 
by participants. However, the 
government would be 
responsible for funding the 
social safety net component 
(the first pillar). Fiscal 
sustainability would be largely 
assured.  
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Issues 
Defined Benefit Social 
Security Scheme as Proposed 
by the Jamsosnas Draft Bill 
A Hypothetical Defined 
Contribution Social Security 
Scheme under the “three-
pillar” paradigm 
Implicit new debts The program’s expenses could 
significantly increase the 
government’s debt in the future, 
which in the end would be 
passed on to participants 
through increased 
contributions/taxation.  
Participants themselves would 
cover any expenses. The 
government has no obligation 
to help pay debts/expenses. 
However, the government 
would be responsible for funding 
the social safety net component 
(the first pillar). 
Investment returns Very low, because usually the 
funds would only be invested in 
banks or government bonds 
which have lower returns. They 
would also usually only be 
invested domestically.  
Likely to be very high, since 
participants would be able to 
choose their own investment 
scheme according to their needs 
(i.e., bank deposits, bonds, 
mutual funds, stocks, etc.). 
Funds could also be invested 
abroad.  
Program coverage While officially all citizens 
would have to participate, in 
practice only a small number of 
participants would actually 
make contributions. Due to the 
high contribution rate, there 
would be a tendency for people 
to avoid paying it by moving to 
the informal sector.  
Usually higher participation 
rates, because of the low 
contribution rates and there 
would be freedom to choose 
investment managers and 
instruments according to 
participants needs.  
Impact on 
investments and 
economic growth 
Largely negative, because high 
contribution/tax rates would 
deter investors and in the end 
reduce economic growth.  
Largely positive, because the 
contribution rate would be 
relatively low. Funds could be 
invested in productive sectors, 
which might increase the 
investment rate, savings rate, 
and economic growth. 
Impact on labor 
market 
Negative, because it would tend 
to increase the unemployment 
rate and force formal sector 
workers to move to the informal 
sector.  
Positive, because it might 
stimulate new investments, 
which would certainly create 
new jobs.  
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Figure 2: The Indonesian National Social Security System Based On The Three-
Pillar System 
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